![]() Just like we monitor and measure our industrial processes, we need to monitor and measure our network environments for abnormal behavior – configuration changes, communication pattern changes, exploitation of vulnerabilities and new or unexpected network connections. Are any external connections being set up?.What is normal communication between those devices?.Who are those devices communicating to?.You should be able to continuously answer questions like these: How do you know if data is coming into or going out of your network? How do you know if there are external connections being set up for ease of use for employees, contractors or vendors? It comes down to knowing your network and placing preventative controls around it. Network “How Do You Know” Questions to Ask How many times do cybersecurity professionals hear, “ Oh, we are air-gapped, we do not need to worry about cybersecurity”? In that case, I would challenge with this: if they do not assess or monitor their network, how would they know if they are air-gapped? Monitoring includes looking for new data coming in from removable media, transient devices or external network connections being set up with modems or VPNs. All of these examples prove that nothing is truly air-gapped – or that it can’t stay 100% air-gapped over time.Īir-gaps give us a false sense of security. What about transient devices such as laptops, tablets and smart phones? Don’t forget about removable media (USB, CD-ROM, etc.), remote access and data coming via sneakernet (any means of transferring data without it traversing a network). There are also non-malicious examples of unauthorized connections, like modems and wireless networks being set up by contractors, maintenance, or control engineers to make their lives easier by transferring data into or out of the air-gapped networks. The most famous example is Stuxnet, the worm that disrupted the process of enriching uranium in Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility – which was reportedly delivered via a thumb drive. It has been proven in a number of scenarios that air-gapped networks can be infiltrated. In theory, air-gapped networks seem like a great idea. Is Air-gapping Effective or a False Sense of Security? Now that more and more field devices are “smart” (connected to and managed through the network), is air-gapping a reliable cybersecurity strategy for the future? In today’s Industry 4.0 revolution, where the network is the control system, analyzing data from the industrial process is key to driving optimization and efficiency. In the industrial world, these air-gapped networks have traditionally supported the industrial control systems within the plant or factory, where communication was physically or logically isolated from the corporate enterprise networks. Because of such threats, many organizations choose to have air-gapped networks. Think of all the damage an attack could cause: loss of productivity, loss of assets such as data, plant shutdown and worse. The simple answer is that isolation implies security.īy the end of 2019, it has been estimated that every 14 seconds a business will fall victim to a ransomware attack. Over the years, networks in a variety of verticals, including government, military, financial services, nuclear power plants and industrial manufacturing, have been so-called “air-gapped.” This deserted island example illustrates what it means to be a part of an air-gapped network – physically isolated with no access to the outside world. Similarly, information from other islands or from around the world will never reach the island – there is simply no physical way for information to get in or out. You have conversations and share information with each other, but those conversations can never be shared outside the group on the island. Think of it this way: You and a few friends are on a deserted island. ![]()
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